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Human Security:
Relevance and Implications
DAN HENK

S

ince the end of the Cold War, the phrase “human security” increasingly
has surfaced in scholarly literature, in the conversations of policy professionals and policy advocates, and occasionally in the popular media. The
phrase itself suggests a departure from the esoteric jargon of the Cold War,
preoccupied with state-centric issues of thermonuclear holocaust, strategic
alliances, compellance and deterrence. But despite its increasing usage, the
new concept rarely is defined for the lay reader and seems to carry a slippery
range of alternative definitions. For some, the association of “human security” with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) either commends its value or undermines its validity, regardless of the content. For
others, the phrase connotes an exciting—or troubling—consensus on security themes by a putative global intelligentsia. Policymakers in several countries have gone so far as to embrace the concept as a foundation for their
national foreign policy, while US policymakers are at best ambivalent or,
more commonly, skeptical.
Can any concept still so undefined and contested really have much
utility? Or more to the point, should US military professionals pay any attention to it? This article argues in the affirmative, acknowledging that it is a paradigm gaining in prominence and may be an important part of the conceptual
environment in which US military professionals will act in the future. The use
of the concept also might have sufficient utility for US policymakers to warrant a closer examination. The purpose of this article is to note the origin,
meaning, and contemporary usage of the “human security” concept, and to
suggest why US military professionals should not ignore it. The article also
will explore several implications of the increasing global interest in the concept and will offer some cautions and concerns.
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Background
In 1992, the prestigious UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, a bastion of establishment thinking, announced a striking
change in its area of concern. Like similar institutions, it traditionally had
been preoccupied with the pursuit of “security.” Its time-honored formula,
reinforced by the concerns of the Cold War, had focused on the “influence of
modern and nuclear weapons of warfare upon the problems of strategy, defence, disarmament, and international relations.” However, the interest now
shifted dramatically to “any major security issues, including without limitation those of a political, strategic, economic, social, or ecological nature.”1
The times, they were “a-changin’,” and conceptions of “security” clearly
were in flux.
In fact, the end of the Cold War unleashed a debate that had been
growing for years, provoked by scholars and practitioners increasingly dissatisfied with traditional conceptions of security.2 Earlier mainstream approaches had tended to limit study of the subject to “the threat, use, and
control of military force” in the context of state-centered international competition.3 But by the late 1970s, some scholars had begun to contest the notion
that the state should be the appropriate referent object and were arguing that
conventional approaches failed to capture the reality of a proliferating cast
of actors and agendas on the world scene which posed a variety of threats to
citizens as well as regimes.4 These views gained a considerable following
through the 1980s,5 and by the early 1990s, the new thinking had begun to
take hold among policymakers in several countries.
An early milestone in the success of the new approaches occurred in
1993, when the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published its
annual Human Development Report which promulgated the formula “human
security,”6 a phrase given even sharper definition in the following year’s report.7 Though it remained controversial and subject to varying definition, the
“human security” paradigm subsequently became something of a benchmark
for an emerging new model of “security,” so it is appropriate to briefly review
how this concept was framed in the 1994 UNDP publication. The publication
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offers a qualifying discussion, castigating at the same time the inadequacies
of earlier thinking on the subject:
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in
foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has
been related more to nation-states than to people. . . . Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people. . . . For many of them, security symbolized
protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social
conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards.8

In contrast to this purportedly discredited “older thinking,” the UNDP
offered a paradigm with a much broader definition derived from the innovative
new approaches, calling it “human security” and portraying it as a “peoplecentered” (rather than state-centered) approach whose principal components
were “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” This kind of security offered safety from chronic threats like hunger, disease, and political repression,
as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of
daily life.” According to the UNDP, the new model required two levels of urgent change by the societies of the world: “from exclusive stress on territorial
security to a much greater stress on people’s security . . . [and] from security
through armaments to security through sustainable human development.”9
The 1994 UNDP document argued that human security required the
attenuation of a wide range of threats to people.10 These were grouped under
several constituent parts:
l Economic security, assuring every individual a minimum requisite income.
l Food security, guaranteeing “physical and economic access to basic food.”
l Health security, guaranteeing a minimum protection from disease
and unhealthy lifestyles.
l Environmental security, protecting people from the short- and
long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment.
l Personal security, protecting people from physical violence, whether from the state, from external states, from violent individuals and
sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, from predatory adults, or
even from the individual himself (as in protection from suicide).
l Community security, protecting people from loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.
l Political security, assuring that people “live in a society that honors their basic human rights.”
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While the publication of the new UNDP formula was a dramatic development, the human security model did not appear out of whole cloth: it simply followed and, to a degree, institutionalized a perspective that already had
been widely debated in the scholarly literature. However, the UN endorsement
was a powerful incentive to policymakers in a number of countries, resonating
particularly in those already active in international efforts to ban landmines
and similar initiatives. By the end of 1999, a group of these countries, along
with scholars and policy advocates, had launched the Human Security Network.11 Significantly, this network was announced at a ministerial-level conference in Norway, held to discuss the international campaign against landmines. Subsequent ministerial-level meetings of the Human Security Network
were held annually.12 By 2004, the network included 12 countries: Austria,
Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Thailand. South Africa was participating as an observer.
The Human Security Network sees itself as an “informal, flexible”
mechanism for “collective action,” bringing “international attention to new
and emerging issues.” It seeks to apply a “human security perspective” to
“energize political processes aimed at preventing or solving conflicts and
promoting peace and development.” It has been involved in a variety of international issues, including elimination of landmines, control of small arms,
establishment of the International Criminal Court, human rights education
and human rights law, the struggle against international crime, and the fight
against HIV and AIDS.13
While the Human Security Network is becoming a significant actor
in its own right, countries that participate in it also have demonstrated an active commitment to the new security paradigm. One of the earliest of these
was South Africa, seeking to redefine its security establishment in the wake
of the turn to majority rule in 1994. In that year, South Africa’s new government launched a wide-ranging national consultation that ultimately resulted
in a series of policy documents, one of which was a White Paper on Defence
published in 1996. That remarkable document captured the clearest expression of human security on record anywhere:
In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has broadened to incorporate political,
economic, social, and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach
is a paramount concern with the security of people.
Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in
freedom, peace, and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic
necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their
health and well-being.14
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“What advantage, if any, does the human security
paradigm offer as either an analytical tool
or a prescription for the pressing dilemmas
of fractured, conflicted human societies?”

The South Africans were early subscribers to the new thinking, but
they were by no means the only ones. Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi sought
to make human security the defining characteristic of Japanese foreign policy, instituting in 1998 a “Trust Fund for Human Security” in the UN Secretariat and funding it generously.15 By the year 2000, Canada also had made
human security the foundation of its foreign policy, defining it as “safety for
people from both violent and non-violent threats . . . characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their
lives.”16 Canadian diplomatic effort and foreign aid soon began to back the
new emphasis with significant national resources.17 Other countries, ranging
from Austria to Switzerland, followed suit.
The Human Security Network has become a significant global actor
and advocate of the new paradigm, an approach increasingly endorsed by nongovernmental organizations and scholars. It also finds approval with the attentive public of a growing global intelligentsia. It has the explicit endorsement of
the world’s preeminent international organization—the United Nations—and
is actively promoted by the current UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Indeed, Annan instituted a Commission on Human Security whose final report,
issued in 2003, has resulted in a permanent UN Advisory Board on Human Security.18 The concept is very likely to grow in prominence.
The new paradigm received another ringing endorsement in September 2004 when the European Union published the Barcelona Report of the
Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, entitled A Human Security
Doctrine for Europe, calling for a “human security [crisis] response force.”
This force would have a heavy civilian specialist component skilled in conflict prevention and social reconstruction. Even its standing military component would be heavily imbued with a human security ethic. While it still is
too early to anticipate the appearance of such a European force, the idea itself
resonates powerfully among intellectuals and policymakers in Western Europe.19 It probably is unwise to dismiss the report’s recommendations merely
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as evidence of a resort to “soft power” by a community imbued with a “psychology of weakness.”20 The Europeans are looking at the world—and their
role in it—in a significantly new way.

Definitions
The popularization of the human security model in the 1990s marked
a signal triumph for proponents of a broad understanding of security, a concept
significantly contested in the wake of the Cold War.21 The debate has tended to
center around four key questions:22
l Who or what should be the focus—the referent object—of security?
l Who or what threatens security?
l Who has the prerogative to provide security?
l What methods are appropriate, or inappropriate, in providing security?
The rich ferment in ideas about security among scholars and practitioners has led to a proliferation of different approaches and models, ranging
from the defense of traditional thinking to advocacy of approaches as novel as
the “feminist” and “post-positivist.”23 The human security paradigm borrows
from a number of the different new approaches, particularly those whose referent object is the individual citizen and which acknowledge security only in
the absence of a wide assortment of different kinds of threats. The emergence
of the concept has been accompanied by substantial differences on its definition and consistency.24 There are nonetheless some common themes in the
definitions, and it is entirely possible to use the four key questions to frame
the boundaries of the field. Ideally, this exploration should be able to generate
an optimal definition sufficiently “rigorous, precise, and logically consistent” to be useful in the formulation of policy.25
On the issue of “referent object,” there is relatively little debate: in
human security, the focus is on people, sometimes further specified as the individual human being. Even so, the UN conceptualization and most other definitions put this referent object in a social context. Part of human security is
“community security”—safety for those networks of relationships and community values in which a human being is embedded and in which individuals
find emotional and physical solace.26
Other than to see them very broadly, there is less consistency in the
literature on the nature of threats. These conceivably could come from a wide
range of sources. From the literature, it is possible to generalize them as any
conditions of life that produce fear and want, but such a generalization illustrates the subjectivity of this categorization. How much fear actually undermines security? What, exactly, constitutes “want”? Or, put another way; is
there any objective way of distinguishing the true “want” that connotes inse96
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curity from the preferences inherent in any individual?27 One useful scholarly
attempt to add rigor to the debate has argued that security involves two elements: “an orientation to future risks and a focus on risks falling below some
critical threshold of deprivation.” The author goes on to suggest that an analytically significant threat to human security would be one that challenges a
“domain” of “well-being” that is “essential or extremely important.” And he
defines that category as including those “that have been important enough for
human beings to fight over or to put their lives and property at great risk.”28
While no listing has been widely accepted as the definitive characterization
of threats to human security, and this one still conveys substantial subjectivity, it can serve as a rough working definition that most human security proponents probably would accept.
If the discussion has any relevance to policy formulation, it must
come to grips with who, or what, can provide “human security.” With its assumed monopoly on violence, the state was clearly the appropriate source of
security in earlier, mainstream conceptualizations of security, though with
the recognition that the state also could be a signal source of insecurity.29 The
human security formula significantly alters this earlier model. As it is now
conceived, the commodity being provided is vastly more complex in detail;
the threats to that commodity also are much broader, more diffuse, and more
intractable. Responsibility for this kind of security cannot be relegated to the
public sector, which egregiously lacks the means to guarantee it even in the
developed nations (although public sectors presumably can play an important
organizing and facilitating role). Most of the recent literature, including the
original UNDP formulation, characterizes human security as a global problem requiring a global solution.30 Achievement of human security is almost
by definition a collaborative effort involving the individual citizen as an active player but also including key roles for civil society groups and institutions; commercial, nongovernmental, and international organizations; and
governments of nation-states.31 To date, no one has developed a compellingly
obvious and effective framework to achieve optimum collaboration across
these sectors and institutions. However, the efforts of advocates like the Human Security Network have succeeded in achieving substantial international
communication and cooperation on specific issues.
This leads naturally enough into the final question: What is within
the “art of the possible” in actually achieving the objectives implied in most
visions of human security? Or, more specifically, what are its methods and efficacy? It is tempting to view human security itself as an end or a desirable future. But it may be more useful to see it either as an analytical framework or as
a strategy—a way of using available means to achieve a general end. Assuming this approach, the desired end probably is long-term freedom from
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fear and want, and human security would be the plan or path to get there. Like
any construct, its users must define its details. But this way of looking at human security still begs the question: as a plan, what can it realistically be expected to accomplish?
This brings the focus back to the discussion of threats. If human security is a useful approach, it will attenuate threats to those dimensions of
deprivation over which human societies are prone to fight. The original
UNDP formula identified seven distinct categories of security that might be
challenged by various threats, though it offered conflict resolution and sustainable economic development as the most fundamental answers to most of
these challenges. And, in fact, much of the relevant literature emphasizes
the importance of poverty alleviation. However, even the most austere visions of human security require an interconnected combination of material,
social, and emotional well-being for individuals within and among human
societies, circumstances that require far more than mere economic development. That being the case, human security is truly a useful new construct
only if it explains how to connect and gain synergy from (among other
things) simultaneous economic development, growing respect for human
rights, increasing public sector capacity, and accountability and maturation
of civil societies.
One important definitional issue—and one on which many advocates
differ—is the degree to which human security should govern the security landscape. The original UNDP formulation argued that human security should be
the dominant security paradigm, an approach apparently adopted by the South
Africans as well.32 On the other hand, the Canadians and the Japanese, both
members of the Human Security Network and committed to a human security
approach in their foreign policy, make a clear distinction between “human security” and “national security” (in the case of Canada) or “state security” (in Japan). These latter concepts encompass the more traditional “security” of
sovereignty, protected borders, and state safety from external attack. Neither
Canada nor Japan appears to prioritize one security paradigm above the other.
Canadian documents describe them as “complementary.”33

The Objections
The broadened definitions of security—including the human security paradigm—have been challenged on a number of conceptual and methodological grounds.34 Scholars have argued that an extension of the construct
to a wide variety of social and environmental phenomena runs a risk of rendering it so all-inclusive that it becomes largely meaningless as an analytical
tool. If every human dilemma is a security issue, so the argument goes, how
will it be possible to identify, categorize, and prioritize what truly must be
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protected?35 Put differently, must every problem encountered by the human
race be elevated to the same level of concern?36 Another conceptual objection
is the difficulty of drawing clear, logical connections between and within the
component parts. For instance, it does not necessarily follow that “community security” preserving traditional values is compatible with “political security” that guarantees individual human rights, that sustainable economic
development is compatible with attenuation of ecological degradation, or
that “economic security” can resolve competing pressures for autarky on one
hand and international economic interdependence on the other.37
Appeals to security tend at the same time to be appeals for access to
the resources of the state. So some scholars have questioned the motives of
the proponents of new approaches to security, challenging the propriety of
conflating domains such as the economy or the environment with security,
and seeing in these attempts little more than either a grab for public-sector
funding that has traditionally been allocated to the security organs of the state
or an attempt to inflate the import of a narrow advocacy issue.38 Some American scholars argue that enthusiasm for the broad new models is little more
than evidence of weakness by communities no longer willing to mobilize the
will or the resources to defend their vital interests.39
All of these arguments have some merit, but none is sufficiently
compelling to halt the growing acceptance of the basic paradigm. Many of the
conceptual objections probably can be met with more precision in definition
and more rigorous efforts to “connect the dots”—to refine the logical interrelationships of the component parts.40 Nor is the paradigm necessarily fundamentally flawed by the contrary tendencies of some of the component parts.
Conflicting or centripetal pressures are present in almost any model of complex human relationships, be it a kinship system, a federal government, or the
player positions on an athletic team. The human security paradigm envisions
a synergy of the component parts, but not an absence of the dynamic tensions,
since these are inherent in any set of human relations.
Some proponents of broadened definitions of security probably are
motivated by a desire for access to those public-sector resources traditionally
channeled to the security organs of the state. But it also seems inevitable that
proponents of an established paradigm will tend to ignore the merits of an argument in their haste to impugn the intelligence or morals of anyone presuming to challenge an established ideology. Human motivations are always hard
to determine with any precision, yet it seems preposterous to categorize all
the proponents of human security as cynical and cunning schemers seeking
only to divert public monies for partisan objectives.
The most serious problem with the human security model is methodological. Few would dispute the desirability of the ends envisioned by its proSummer 2005
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ponents. The troubling issue is how to operationalize the concept, and the
significant question is not “Is it desirable?” but rather, “Is it feasible, and if so,
how can it be implemented?” Since the early 1990s, the emphasis on human security has resulted in considerable effort. Several countries have extensively
readjusted their foreign policy to fit the new paradigm. Still others have committed significant aid in support of the new approach. Policymakers, activists,
advocates, and scholars have organized innumerable conferences and workshops. Yet it is difficult to point to any troubled area of the world where this effort has resulted in tangible progress toward the human security goals of its
advocates, however those goals are defined. The literature has yet to offer a
good case in which some combination of actors effectively organized themselves to achieve remarkable collaborative synergy across all the component
domains of human security. While there is no reason to accept these as clinching arguments for rejecting the concept, there still is a paucity of empirical
proof for the concept’s efficacy.
The methodological problem is compounded by the failure of the
paradigm to date to achieve preeminence over competing conceptions of security, particularly “state security.” The human security model, by its nature,
claims to be the predominant security paradigm and sets an agenda in which
the traditional criteria of national security play a minor supporting role. This
is evident in the arguments of some human security proponents such as Larry
Swatuk and Peter Vale, who attribute insecurity in southern Africa largely to
the “Westphalian state form,”41 and whose conception of human security requires a deconstruction and demystification of state sovereignty.42 Even in
cases where the two models are considered complementary, as in Canada,43 it
seems likely that the coexistence is explained more by efforts to placate a “national security constituency” than by any real compatibility of the two concepts. Ultimately, one model or the other will command a society’s attention
and the preponderance of resources.

The Potential
What advantage, if any, does the human security paradigm offer as
either an analytical tool or a prescription for the pressing dilemmas of fractured, conflicted human societies at the beginning of the 21st century? As a
tool it may have any number of uses, but one clearly is an ability to highlight
both the complexity of the problems of conflict and the sophistication of the
efforts that must succeed if those problems are to be attenuated. An exploration of this theme requires a brief resort to the issue of culture, and a return to
the notion of deprivation.
Culture, of course, has been defined in a host of different ways. But
its essence is “connectedness,” or, more precisely, the shared values and be100
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haviors of human beings. A significant scholarship has explored the nature
and meaning of the ties that bind individuals.44 These ties actually are agreements and understandings about the appropriate responsibilities, rights, and
obligations between people. They are patterns of ideas found in the minds of
individuals. They consist of mental models of appropriate behavior that individuals acquire in their processes of socialization in a given cultural context.45 Most of these models are at the level of unconscious basic assumptions.46 A typical individual shares these understandings with a variety of different groupings in his or her society. For instance, in a kinship-based society,
many rights and obligations derive from position in the kinship network. Yet
even in strongly kinship-based social environments, the rights and obligations inherent in kinship ideology compete with others. An individual also
might be part of a religious group with a separate set of relationships, or a
sports club, political party, or business with still other sets. Any cultural environment provides a variety of incentives—both positive and negative—that
reinforce the linkages in the mental models.
Research generally has demonstrated that individuals perceive the
strongest ties with the smallest and most proximate groups.47 However, the
weaker ties with the larger, more amorphous, heterogeneous groupings also
are important for societal or national cohesion.48 Although there always is
some inherent tension between obligations, a well-functioning society will
have a complex network of incentives that reinforce integrative, cooperative
behavior and that sanction deviant behavior. When the network of reinforcing
incentives breaks down, the stronger ties tend to last longer than the weaker
ones. This is why, for instance, the relationships of kinship or religion so often outlast those of national citizenship.
The implicit agreements about rights and obligations in the mental
models of individuals often break because of some deprivation, though the
form of deprivation itself can vary widely. Some bonds break when individuals consider themselves egregiously deprived of the material necessities of
life, or of a minimum essential level of safety of persons and property, or of
traditional rights. Other deprivations that can motivate conflict include an intolerable loss of honor. Emile Durkheim, an early sociologist, called attention
in late 19th-century France to an increase in social pathologies (suicide,
crime) that correlated directly to the rapidity of social change. In other words,
individuals deprived of a sense of control over their destiny were more inclined to reject the established norms of social intercourse.49
People will tend to mobilize around the groupings that offer the
strongest ties or that offer the prospect of attenuating the deprivation that they
most fear. This is where human security provides a very useful conceptual
tool. The paradigm calls attention to the broad spectrum of different kinds of
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“The human security paradigm provides
some basis for answering the challenges
posed by the common pathologies
evident in failing and failed states.”

deprivation and thus can help identify the ties that are broken in situations of
conflict. It can assist in identifying what must be restored, rebuilt, or replaced
to achieve stability and peace.
These ties, at various levels, are particularly and profoundly fractured in those cases of tragedy now labeled “failed states.”50 These would
seem to be egregiously in need of the features in any vision of human security,
and typically are characterized by profound deprivation: little economic security, food security, or health security. A deteriorating natural environment
also characterizes some. Most are notorious for sectarian violence or seething
ethnic tensions. Any reference to human rights typically is almost laughable,
with rampant, predatory criminality, abuse of women and the most vulnerable
individuals, and warlordism. Personal and community security tends to be
tenuous at best. Failed and failing states are relational catastrophes with environmental, economic, and social dimensions.
The human security paradigm provides some basis for answering the
challenges posed by the common pathologies evident in failing and failed
states. It calls attention to the necessity for a coordinated approach on the part
of multiple actors (including residents and groups within the state itself) that simultaneously can deal with an array of present and future threats. At a minimum, this requires effective efforts to develop public-sector redistributive
capacity, private-sector employment opportunity, and the civil society safetynet infrastructure, and also requires complementary development of justice
protocols, with some provision for law enforcement, administration of justice,
reinforcement of contract law, and protection of basic human rights. The paradigm bolsters the argument that uncoordinated, sporadic, and incremental efforts often are largely ineffective at attenuating perceived deprivation and
producing meaningful security in the long run.
Even assuming it is used effectively as a plan for action or a conceptual tool, the human security concept is not a panacea for all the difficult and
destabilizing issues in the developing world. Even if pursued with coherence,
102
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vigor, and plentiful resources, the paradigm is applied to man’s most intractable problems and is likely to require years of persistent effort before yielding
unambiguous results. It is unlikely to accomplish all that its most fervent proponents claim. However, its potential benefits make it worth some attention.

Cautions and Suggestions
By almost any definition so far proposed, human security is achievable only in synergistic collaboration across social, institutional, and sectoral
boundaries. This is much easier to advocate than to accomplish, and if it ever
truly occurs, achieving it probably will require a remarkable ability on the
part of its participants to discard some older models of human relationships.
For instance, an implicit assumption is that participants are able to defer the
gratification of partisan short-term gain for the long-term common benefit,
and can trust other participants to behave likewise. This kind of security is
gained, not imposed. This kind of trust is given grudgingly, not readily. The
model probably will work only if rich and powerful actors willingly renounce
pride of place in organizing the effort and in reaping the prestige they otherwise are inclined to expect. Conceivably, obscure actors from civil society or
from the community of nongovernmental and international organizations
may play the leading roles in the effort. Whatever role the US government assumes in such an effort, US motives constantly will be suspect and the behavior of US personnel will be heavily scrutinized.
US government engagement—civilian or military—in any effort to
build human security probably requires a willingness to work with local partners whose values and behavioral norms are diverse and very different from
the norms of Western industrial societies. In fact, the paradigm itself suggests
that it is important to maintain a constant search for civil-society partners and
to look for them in unusual places such as kinship systems, business networks
in the informal economy, youth gangs, sports clubs, women’s advocacy
groups, and religious cult groups. It also is conceivable that a human security
partnership may include countries whose interests are otherwise at odds, such
as the United States and Iran.
It is important that participants take a very long-term view of future
benefits. A human security agenda almost by definition requires consistency
and patience. The coherence and comprehensiveness of the effort must be
matched by its persistence. It may take years, possibly decades, to see tangible results. However, for practical purposes it is appropriate to develop mechanisms by which success can be measured: it is unlikely that US policymakers
will sustain a long-term commitment of resources without some reasonably
concrete indicators that the risk is reasonable and the investment is sound.
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Finally, a human security approach probably will not succeed unless
many of its participants are willing to reject false dichotomies and are sensitive
to the limitations of their own cultural preferences, including a tendency to prioritize what should not be subject to prioritization. For instance, all societies
and groups—including US military organizations—have a tendency to value
some forms of leadership and progress above others. The human security paradigm argues the importance of simultaneous progress in a variety of domains:
economic, health, environmental, political. This requires a degree of holistic
thinking somewhat at odds with the dictates of Western military efficiency.

Relevance to US Military Leaders
It is inevitable that US military organizations will find themselves in
contingency deployments in which some (or even most) of their coalition
partners will be pursuing a foreign policy heavily anchored in human security
assumptions. Those assumptions could significantly constrain what the partners are willing to do, and may at the same time result in substantial pressure
on the US military force to comply with novel, human security-based perspectives and understandings. However, the emphasis on human security by
institutions like the European Union may also offer new prospects for very
productive contingency partnerships, in which each partner brings essential
niche capabilities not shared by the others. This suggests that senior US military personnel should at a minimum be thoroughly familiar with emerging
thinking on this topic, and also suggests that the overall success of the endeavor may oblige US military participants to play unaccustomed roles or to
be open to unprecedented opportunities.
Since the end of the Cold War, the US military establishment has
made significant progress in its ability to work with a variety of private- and
public-sector partners both in contingency situations and in more routine theater engagement activities that promote human security ends. However, behind
all these activities is a comfortable stereotype of civil-military relations in
which the US military serves US interests, bringing the resources, organizational talent, and project leadership, while retaining the prerogative to apply
lethal force quickly and decisively if the activity is threatened. The human security paradigm challenges the propriety of each component of this stereotype.
It relegates the coercive instruments of state power to secondary roles, questions the public sector monopoly on allocation of value, and insists on the essentially equivalent prominence and contribution of individual and corporate
stakeholders. Navigating successfully through these novel assumptions will
take every whit of mature perspective and human relations expertise that US
military leaders can muster.
104
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